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Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Nostalgia” 
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University of New Mexico 
 
Samuel Wheeler has insightfully and helpfully responded to my essay, “The Breath of Sense: 
Language, Structure, and the Paradox of Origin,” which was itself a partial summary and 
development of interpretative views about the history of twentieth century philosophy 
articulated in my recent book Philosophy and the Vision of Language (Routledge, 2008).  In the 
following, I respond briefly to Wheeler’s commentary, tracing areas of convergence and 
remaining disagreements.  Specifically, Wheeler’s response focuses in detail on the implications 
of the aporia implicit in Quine’s “indeterminacy of radical translation” thesis, including the 
development of these implications in the work of Donald Davidson.  On my view, this aporia, in 
its general form, has deep and important implications for our understanding of our everyday, 
lived relationship to the language that we speak.  Wheeler agrees about the existence and 
philosophical significance of translational indeterminacy as stated by Quine, but seeks, largely 
through his sympathetic exposition of Davidson’s position, to limit the implications of Quine’s 
result and related aporias for our everyday experience of language.  My main disagreement with 
Wheeler is that I do not think these implications can be thus limited.  Davidson’s mature views 
about language and interpretation do indeed represent a reasonable systematic development 
and extension of Quine’s aporia, but they also, as I shall briefly argue, mean giving up on the 
structuralist project of providing a description in neutral terms of a language by displaying its 
underlying and constitutive structure of rules of use.  But if such a neutral description is 
impossible, as both Quine’s and Davidson’s views tend to suggest, then our everyday, lived 
relationship to language is very different than that which both ordinary discourse and 
“traditional” philosophy have presupposed, and the problem that Heidegger discusses as that of 
the “being of language” indeed unavoidably rears its (ugly or promising?) head. 
The question of how we relate to our own (ordinary) language also clearly bears 
important implications for the legacy of the analytic tradition, which has centrally and decisively 
made the meaning of ordinary language a main topic of philosophical investigation.  In sketching 
the motivations for Quine’s internal critique of Carnap’s conventionalism, Wheeler suggests 
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that it was Quine’s rejection of a residual essentialism about meanings that led Quine to his 
own empiricism.  In Word and Object, Quine replaces “meanings” as traditionally conceived with 
the much more limited notion of “stimulus meanings,” tractable in terms of the route from 
sensory stimulus to behavioral response.1   Quine’s rejection of the residual essentialism still 
present in Carnap’s attempt to draw an analytic/synthetic distinction is indeed a leading 
example of the strongly anti-metaphysical bearing of much analytic philosophy of language.  But 
to claim that empiricism about meaning is obligatory once essentialism is rejected is, I think, to 
give us (at least) one alternative too few.  For the most significant results of the analytic 
tradition, Quine’s included, can also be interpreted as yielding a set of critical approaches to 
language that are neither essentialist nor empiricist, but rather continue the Kantian critique of 
metaphysics by collectively suggesting an ever-renewed reflection on the role of language in 
propounding and consolidating determinative pictures of human life.  Here, the important 
question is not so much what meanings “actually are,” as how our conceptions of language and 
linguistic meaning drive broader assumptions about intersubjective praxis and shared social life.  
In my essay, I documented several instances at which leading results of the analytic tradition 
(including Quine’s) have played a role in demystifying the traditional picture of language that 
opposes immaterial meaning to material signs as soul is opposed to body.  These pictures of 
language and life play, I think, an important role in organizing conceptions of human practice and 
social life.  But their demystification does not depend on adopting an empiricist view of what 
meanings are, but rather on continuing to pose the critical question of the limits of language as 
we encounter those limits in the varied circumstances of our lives. 
On the first page of his response, Professor Wheeler raises four challenges to what he 
takes to be the overall interpretive position I took in the essay.  First, he questions “whether 
Quine’s argument [for indeterminacy] is in fact a consequence of naturalism and structuralism.”  
Second, he challenges the claim that “contemporary naturalism is committed to … Quine’s 
thesis.”  Third, he questions “whether analytic philosophy has abandoned its previous insistence 
on the centrality of language to philosophy because of Quine’s aporia.”  Finally, he suggests that 
the aporia might helpfully be taken as a “discovery” rather than simply as a “paradox.”  In the 
following, I respond to these challenges in reverse order. 
Taking the last point first, I am happy to agree that Quine’s result, like several of the 
major results of the analytic tradition (e.g. Russell’s paradox and Gödel’s incompleteness 
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theorem), is at least as much a contribution to our understanding of its subject matter as it 
represents a problem for this understanding.  Just as Russell’s paradox shows us something 
about the nature of sets by frustrating a natural, intuitive preconception about which sets can 
exist, so Quine’s result certainly contributes, even if only in a “negative” way, to our 
understanding of what we pre-theoretically term “language.”  More generally, as I argue in detail 
in Philosophy and the Vision of Language, many of the main results of the analytic tradition tend to 
demonstrate the inherently paradoxical implications of what would otherwise appear to be 
natural and intuitive assumptions about the nature and existence of language as a whole, for 
instance the assumptions that language is constituted by rules of use governing the 
intercombination and application of signs and that these rules are, in principle, intelligible as a 
whole to theoretical analysis or reflection.  All of these results (including Wittgenstein’s rule-
following considerations and Sellars’ “pure pragmatism” about meaning) do indeed bear first 
and foremost against the theoretician’s specialized attempt to grasp language by elucidating its 
underlying structural principles.  But as I argue in more detail in the book, in so doing they 
cannot help but raise the question of what we (pre-theoretically) can mean in invoking language 
or its nature, as we do on manifold occasions of ordinary life.  If a language, as Quine’s aporia 
tends to suggest, cannot be specified in neutral terms as a set of constitutive rules, then it 
becomes deeply mysterious what it is to learn one or speak one, or what kind of knowledge we 
ascribe to someone who is able to do either. 
With the third of Wheeler’s points above, I also agree wholeheartedly.  As a matter of 
conceptual genealogy and sociology, the widespread abandonment of language as a foundational 
topic of investigation in the work of (self-identified) analytic philosophers over the last twenty 
or thirty years is not a direct consequence of Quine’s result, but owes much more, as Wheeler 
helpfully points out, to the prominence of essentialist arguments derived from Kripke’s 
arguments in Naming and Necessity and related texts.  I concur with Wheeler, as well, in 
regretting the return of essentialist metaphysics and share his view that this return is not 
sufficiently motivated by the arguments that have been given.  In the paper, I meant to suggest, 
not that Quine’s result has or should have led philosophers to give up on the characteristic 
analytic investigation of language, but only that the result bears deeply on what we should take 
to be the large-scale legacy of this investigation as it has been conducted over the course of the 
twentieth century.  Again, I wholly share Wheeler’s evident sense that it would be beneficial for 
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practitioners of analytic philosophy to return to the central and determinative concern with 
language that was the original inspiration of the tradition and the source of all of its most 
distinctive problems and results, including the very results that motivated the “return to 
metaphysics” in the 1970s and 80s.   These problems have by no means subsequently been 
resolved by positive theory or discoveries, and can indeed, as I argue in my book, be the site of 
important contributions to critical thinking about intersubjectivity and politics, among other 
open philosophical topics. 
With respect to the question of the historical provenance of contemporary naturalism 
(Wheeler’s second challenge), I think it is important to distinguish Quine’s internal critique of 
structuralism from his surrounding commitments to the naturalism which tended to determine 
his way of presenting the results of the critique.  On my telling, the aporia Quine discovered 
with respect to translation is essentially a result of the inherent instability of the structuralist 
picture of language, which holds that language as a whole is a structure of rules.  The aporia 
itself does not depend centrally on naturalism or a naturalistic (for instance, a behaviorist) 
account of the facts available to the translator.  Indeed, very similar critical results have been 
demonstrated by philosophers who were not in any sense committed to a natural-scientific 
description of the actual basis of language use; witness, for instance, Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of 
the central “paradox” of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations.2  As I argued in the 
paper, Quine’s presentation of naturalism in the restricted context of epistemology was mainly 
a late and largely negative gloss on what he took to be the upshot of the radical translation 
result.  If it is indeed impossible to achieve translational determinacy, then the “foundationalist” 
(actually, positivist or phenomenalist) project of attempting to ground empirical knowledge on a 
neutral basis of immediately given experience must be abandoned, and a naturalistic ersatz for 
epistemology must be (Quine supposed) all that remains possible.  His naturalistic 
commitments were therefore the context in which Quine elaborated and expounded his views 
about language, meaning, and foundationalism, but they were by no means an essential 
component of these views themselves.  Unfortunately, however, it is these naturalist 
background commitments, rather than Quine’s most central results about language and 
meaning, that have survived and become dominant within recent analytic philosophy, meanwhile 
attaining a much more positive and programmatic character than they had for Quine himself. 
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This brings me to the first point Wheeler mentions, and the only one on which I think 
there is genuine and deep disagreement between us.  This is the suggestion that Quine’s 
argument for indeterminacy is not in fact inevitable given his structuralist and empiricist starting 
points (or at least something like them), and accordingly that the indeterminacy result, or what 
it tends to suggest, need not deeply trouble either the prospects for a structuralist picture of 
language or our ordinary access to the language that we speak.  Wheeler makes this case 
largely through his sympathetic exposition of Davidson’s views about meaning and 
interpretation, which indeed share the structuralist motivations of Quine’s thesis but do not 
draw the same paradoxical and aporetic conclusions.  From the first of his published writings on 
language, Davidson sought to modify the Quinean result into a more general and 
comprehensive theory of “radical interpretation.”   Davidson held that we can specify a 
recursive “theory of interpretation” or “theory of meaning” for a natural language by specifying 
rules that systematically specify the truth-conditions for the language’s sentences in accordance 
with Tarski’s “convention T.”3  Thus, an axiomatized “theory of interpretation” for a natural 
language has as its consequences truth-conditional specifications of the form: “Grass is green” is 
true if and only if grass is green.  And the task of a theory of interpretation is to provide a finite 
corpus of principles capable of generating all such T-sentences.  
As Wheeler points out, Davidson’s shift from focusing on radical translation to focusing 
on radical interpretation significantly limits the scope of translational indeterminacy.  For Quine, 
“charity principles” ungrounded in the facts themselves are, at best, useful in bridging the gap 
between these facts and a systematic translation; for Davidson, by contrast, charity principles 
are unavoidable and implicitly operative in any understanding of a meaningful utterance as such.  
Because of this, Davidson eschews any account of interpretation as beginning with “raw facts” 
or data of either a behavioral or physiological kind; interpretation is always already at work, and 
there is no hope of reconstructing the basis of meaning from a supposedly neutral set of 
uninterpreted facts or data about speech behavior.  Additionally, since interpretation and 
charity are always already at work even in the understanding of the most ordinary utterances, 
there is no longer any way to characterize a language or the “conceptual scheme” it embodies 
as matching, fitting, or capturing any pre-given data (either of a physical or phenomenal kind).  
With this, as Davidson argued in the notorious “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 
the very possibility of distinguishing between various conceptual schemes in terms of the ways 
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they fit or match pre-given content also lapses, and the possibility of a “scheme-content” 
distinction is repudiated as the third (and final) “dogma of empiricism.”4  It thus emerges as 
something like a transcendental condition on the possibility of understanding any set of 
behaviors as meaningful utterances that they cannot be seen as embodying a conceptual scheme 
radically at odds with my own; for us to be communicating at all, it is necessary that we agree, 
at least in a large-scale way, about truth and meaning.  Because of this, as Wheeler suggests, any 
indeterminacy or ambiguity that actually arises in the course of interpretation, either across 
languages or within a single one, will be relatively local, limited, and fairly easily resolved.  
Disagreements may arise about which of the various senses of an ambiguous term is intended, 
but this kind of disagreement will evidently no longer deeply threaten our pre-existing intuitions 
about the (relative) fixity and determinacy of meaning. 
As Wheeler points out as well, Davidson’s theory is “structuralist” in at least some of 
the senses of that term; although Davidson ultimately abandoned the conventionalist picture of 
languages as communally shared patterns of behavior, he continued to hold that an individual 
speaker’s idiolect, at any moment, could at least in principle be fully specified by a recursive 
interpretation theory, and the statement of such a theory would specify the rules actually 
determinative of the speaker’s usage at that time.  Does the example of Davidson, then, show 
that structuralist theories of language need not lead to the general aporia about our knowledge 
of language that underlies Quine’s indeterminacy result?  Pace Wheeler, I think that it does not 
in fact show this.  For although Davidson’s theory is “structuralist” in important respects, and 
although it gives us reason to believe that the extent of actual indeterminacy will be limited 
where common access to language can be presupposed, there is nevertheless good reason to doubt 
that it can resolve the general aporia about the basis of our access to language itself to which 
Quine’s theory also points.  It is true that a Davidsonian interpretation theory, as opposed to a 
Quinean translation manual, avoids the problem of the relationship between the uninterpreted 
“facts” of linguistic usage or physiology and an interpreted language; in this way Davidson avoids 
recapitulating the indeterminacy result in its starkest form.  But for this very reason, a 
Davidsonian interpretation theory necessarily stops short of giving an illuminating and 
comprehensive account of what is involved in knowing a language at all.   In making interpretation 
a matter of intra-linguistic understanding rather than the Quinean problem of making sense of 
otherwise uninterpreted utterances, Davidson’s account fails to settle the more basic question 
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of what is involved in knowing the meaning of a language’s terms at all.5  The underlying 
problem that vexes structuralism in all of its forms – the ultimate instability of its account of the 
existence and nature of language as a whole – remains, and continues to render what we 
understand intuitively as our “knowledge of language” deeply problematic. 
We can see more clearly why Davidson’s approach does not ultimately avoid the 
problem that troubles structuralism in all of its forms by considering in more detail the actual 
structure of a Davidsonian interpretation theory.  As we have seen, the point of such a theory 
for a natural language is to give a recursively specifiable set of rules capable of determining the 
truth-conditions of each assertoric sentence of the language, in accordance with Tarski’s 
convention T.  Now, in what sense (if any) would such a theory, even if completely worked out, 
actually capture the knowledge that is embodied in the ability that a competent native speaker 
has to speak his or her first language?  Clearly, it is important to Davidson that an 
interpretation theory does indeed embody (in some sense) the knowledge that a speaker 
possesses (in some sense) in virtue of possessing the ability to speak her language; indeed, 
Davidson at several places imposes restrictions on the form of an interpretation theory based 
on the requirement that a language be learnable in a finite amount of time and that our 
knowledge of it be empirically verifiable.6  But since the ability to speak a language (any 
language) is also the ability to competently use many concepts, the knowledge that is attributed 
to a speaker in attributing to her the capability to speak the language must necessarily include 
the knowledge underlying this ability.  Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that an interpretation 
theory’s schematization of a language, as a systematic account of the dependence of sentential 
truth-conditions on the compositional intercombinations of more basic linguistic terms, also 
provides a schematization of the systematic interrelationships of at least the language’s basic 
concepts.7  But while there is good reason to think that an interpretation theory can indeed 
thus provide a kind of schematization of a language’s concepts, there is in fact little reason to 
think that knowledge of this schematization is itself capable of conferring a grasp of these basic 
concepts upon  an interpreter who does not already possess them.  In an influential article entitled 
“What is a Theory of Meaning?”, Michael Dummett distinguishes between two ways of 
understanding the overall form of a (Davidsonian) interpretation theory.8  Such a theory will be, 
in Dummett’s terminology, “full-blooded” if explicit knowledge of the truths it contains is 
capable of conferring upon its knower a grasp of the basic concepts involved in those truths 
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(i.e., those involved in the statements of truth-conditions on the right-hand side of the Tarski-
sentences).  Otherwise – if the interpretation theory does not suffice to confer a grasp of the 
basic concepts it utilizes – Dummett terms it “modest.”   
Although Dummett himself sought to defend a conception of Davidsonian interpretation 
theories as full-blooded, McDowell has argued convincingly (1983,1997) that such theories must 
after all be construed as modest.  There are various reasons for suspecting that this is so, but 
one of the most important that McDowell cites is that we have no way, in general, to 
understand a speaker’s linguistic behavior as manifesting her grasp of a familiar concept unless 
we count ourselves as entitled to the general assumption that she is using concepts roughly as 
we do.  McDowell makes the point by considering the question of what is needed in order to 
attribute to someone the concept square: 
Can implicit knowledge that that is how square things are to be treated 
be manifested in behavior, characterized ‘as from outside’ content?  It 
may seem that nothing could be simpler: the manifestation would be 
someone’s treating a square thing in whatever way is in question.  But any 
such performance would be an equally good manifestation of any of an 
indefinite number of different pieces of such implicit knowledge.  
(Consider implicit knowledge to the effect that that is the way to treat 
things that are either square or . . . .)  If we assume a stable propensity, 
guided by an unchanging piece of implicit knowledge, we can use further 
behavior to rule out some of these competing candidates.  But no finite 
set of performances would eliminate them all; and finite sets of 
performances are all we get.9   
As McDowell’s presentation brings out, the problem here is essentially the same as the general 
“paradox” of rule-following described in Kripke’s (1982) now-classic exposition of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.  Given any finite number of performances (even if 
these are taken as manifesting the grasp of some linguistic concept, and so not as ‘mere 
behavior’ or behavioral facts), it nevertheless remains open to us to take that set as manifesting 
the grasp of any of an infinite number of concepts.  The only way to prevent this indeterminacy 
from threatening is, then, simply to assume that the subject of interpretation already possesses 
the same concept we do (e.g., in this case, our concept square).    But then what we attribute to 
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the subject in attributing to her knowledge (even implicit knowledge) of a Davidsonian 
interpretation theory for her own language is only intelligible against the background 
assumption that we do, indeed, share with her a large stock of concepts already.  It follows that 
it is impossible for these theories by themselves to convey a grasp of the relevant concepts; 
Davidsonian theories must indeed be “modest” in Dummett’s sense.10 
It is important to recognize just what this result does and does not imply about our 
ordinary knowledge of a language.  It is true, as McDowell hastens to point out, that neither this 
problem nor Wittgenstein’s paradox implies that we do not or cannot “know what we mean” 
in using words in the ordinary ways that we do.  For as long as a shared background set of 
practices, or patterns of usage, can be assumed, there is no problem with assuming that my 
interlocutor’s performances will continue to accord with what I expect, given my attribution to 
her of the concepts I do in fact attribute.  As McDowell puts it, in discussing the closely related 
issue of the completion of a numerical series: 
We should not take the Wittgensteinian point … to reveal an 
unexpected fragility in our claims to understand one another.  In real life, 
at least in some cases, it can be much better than a mere hypothesis for 
me that someone is not engaged in a pattern that goes on “…, 1000, 
1004, 1008, …”.  I can know that she will not go on like that – barring 
mental aberration, a prank, or whatever.  But that is because in such 
cases I know that what she is doing warrants a description at the level of 
‘obeying the instruction to add 2’.  I have the knowledge I do of the 
pattern to which the behavior conforms … as described in terms that 
function below the level of that description, only derivatively from my 
knowledge that that description applies.  If I suspend that knowledge, as I 
must if I am required to refrain from using the concepts that figure in it, 
the pattern takes on, as before, the aspect of a hypothesis…11  
That is, nothing about the necessity of modesty in interpretation theories or about 
Wittgenstein’s paradox itself tends to threaten our ability to attribute knowledge of meanings 
to our interlocutors, if common possession of a shared background of practice, and the knowledge of 
concepts embodied in it, can be presupposed.  Moreover, as McDowell’s example brings out, such 
a shared background is, in general, presupposed whenever we interpret another’s behavior as 
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linguistic behavior at all.  Indeed, one way of taking the point of Davidson’s employment of 
charity principles as preconditions for the possibility of interpretation is precisely that we must 
assume some such shared background in order to interpret at all.  Nevertheless, it is one thing 
to say that we do in fact make this kind of assumption, or even that we must make it in order 
for interpretation to be possible; but it is quite another to claim that this necessity makes the 
assumption innocent, on the level of our understanding of the nature of language itself.  If a 
common background of concepts and practices indeed must be assumed in this way for 
interpretation to be possible, there is no hope that a Davidsonian interpretation theory will 
provide any useful general account of what it is to possess concepts or to speak a language at 
all.  
What is the nature, and what the grounding, of the “agreement” between us that must 
be assumed in order for us to be intelligible to one another?  In the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein specifies this agreement in response to an interlocutor who sketches a 
“conventionalist” view of truth and falsity as determined by what we (can) agree upon: 
241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use.  That is not agreement in opinions 
but in form of life. 
That is, the mutual agreement or “attunement” 12 that is necessary if we are to be able to 
communicate at all is not so much a matter of agreement on matters of fact or opinion 
(although, as Davidson argues, widespread agreement about what is true may also be 
necessary), as it is agreement on (or attunement in) the whole immense and scarcely 
describable variety of ways of relating, behaving, interacting and doing things collectively that 
Wittgenstein terms a “form of life.”  The extent of this agreement is vast, but it does have its 
limits; and where it breaks down, there is, in general, nothing that a theory of meaning or 
interpretation (or, indeed, any theory of language) can do to help.  Wittgenstein’s response to 
the interlocutory voice, here, reflects the ultimate inability of any theory of language (whether 
of a structuralist or any other kind) to assure the basis of agreement that must obtain, if we are 
to be able to understand each other at all.  But at this point, the problem of what is involved in 
our everyday shared access to the language that we speak becomes one that cannot be 
resolved by any theory that would seek to guarantee the ground of this access, but must rather 
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be lived recurrently in our everyday experience of our relation to (what we take to be) the 
language we speak. 
Whatever their merits, then, I conclude that Davidsonian interpretation theories cannot 
provide any real solution to the problem to which structuralist theories originally attempted to 
respond, namely that of giving an account of what we know when we can speak a language and 
what is involved in our everyday access to it.  If we are gripped with the question of how it is 
possible for any word or symbol to mean anything, or how it is possible for us to have access 
to (a) language at all, or what precisely one needs to know in order to know and be able to 
speak one, Davidsonian interpretation theories will not help. 
Now, it might be thought that, given the extent to which ordinary interlocution can 
admittedly proceed untroubled (at least in normal cases) despite Quine’s and Davidson’s 
results, these questions need not really grip us; perhaps, as Wheeler comes close to suggesting 
toward the end of his response, these questions themselves ought rather to be dismissed as 
grounded in a kind of illusion.  Certainly, as Wheeler suggests, the results of Davidson, Quine, 
and Wittgenstein speak with one voice in demonstrating that the questions: “how do I know 
the meaning of a word?” and “what assures that another means the same things by her words 
as I do by my same-sounding ones?” are not to be answered by recourse to introspective data, 
psychological facts, states of consciousness, or anything else “internal” in the phenomenological 
sense.  Even more stringently, as I have argued in my book and (much more briefly) above, the 
common form of the aporetic results of all three philosophers seems to demand, as well, that 
these questions cannot readily be answered with “external” data (whether of a behaviorist, 
physiological, or sociological kind) either.    
Yet even if the aporias demonstrated by the course of twentieth-century analytic 
philosophy are able to show that the provision of new data of whatever kind will not suffice to 
answer the question of the nature of our relationship to the language we speak, it does not 
follow that this question is itself illusory or badly posed.  Indeed, it seems to me that this 
question remains as significant as ever, if only because our conceptions of the dimensions of 
significance of a human life – what projects to undertake, how to think about our aspirations 
and capabilities, how to understand our involvement in common projects or the social forms 
that mediate them – continue to depend in detail on the ways that we conceive and envision 
the form of our relation to the language that we speak.  In other words, the activity of 
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envisioning language is of a piece with our activity of conceiving of the means, ends, and forms 
of a human life, and this entwinement alone is sufficient to show that the theoretical results that 
demonstrate that a straightforward answer to the problem of language is not forthcoming 
should not lead us to abandon the problem itself.  More specifically, as I argue in more detail in 
my book, the structuralist picture of language, despite its theoretical failings, has repeatedly 
proved decisive in the motivating characteristic patterns of thought and modes of collective 
action in the twentieth century, and these patterns of thought and action have themselves 
played a determinative role in politics, culture, and the organization of social life.  If this is right, 
then the internal theoretical critique that the structuralist picture undergoes at the hands of 
Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson and (in a different way) Heidegger, can scarcely fail to have deep 
and potentially transformative implications for the ways that we think the possible forms of our 
mutuality and the pursuit of a common linguistic life. 
What is to be done with a problem which, as frustrating and intractable to theoretical 
solution as this one seems to be, nevertheless seems recurrently and unavoidably to arise 
almost as soon as critical reflection on the forms of our lives begins?  The closest parallel I 
know is the situation of reason itself, as described by Kant in the first edition of the Critique of 
Pure Reason: 
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge 
it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of 
reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its 
powers, it is also not able to answer.13 
According to Kant, reason’s own imperative to seek unity in the world drives it to pose 
questions, for instance about the beginning of the world in time and its ultimate material 
composition, that cannot be answered by any positive theory, but at the same time cannot be 
avoided as long as we employ reason at all.  The objects of the “ideas of reason” (God, World, 
and Soul) are indeed illusory; but the illusion is unavoidable as long as we seek to understand 
the sources of our being, the totality of its horizon, and its most inward nature.  Moreover, the 
repeated frustration of theoretical reason in attempting to provide objects for its own 
problematic concepts is, from another perspective, simply the necessary opening of practical 
reason in its further pursuit of the solution of the problems of action; for once we eschew any 
theoretical employment of the ideas of reason, they nevertheless retain a “regulative” role in the 
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reflective determination of courses of action and the motivations of the will.  If, then, language-
as-a-whole is indeed, and for similar reasons, to be understood as a Transcendental Illusion, 
then the Quinean, Wittgensteinian, or Davidsonian diagnosis of the error nevertheless leaves 
the illusion in place on the level of ordinary reflection; and if we cannot seek to avoid it as long 
as we employ linguistic reason (that is, as long as we reflect on the forms of our speech), a 
critical response to its inherent dialectic can nevertheless provide the key to a renewal of the 
problem on the practical level of our lived relationships with one another. 
Speaking more genealogically, it seems to me that the aporetic results of the 1950s and 
1960s faced the analytic tradition with a relatively stark and determinative choice of 
methodological courses.  Given the variety of results that tended to show the untenability of 
the structuralist conception of language (on which the whole notion of linguistic “analysis” had 
been based) and hence tended to suggest that a straightforward theoretical answer to the 
question “what is language as a whole?” would not be forthcoming, one evident option was to 
give up on the question itself.  This is in fact the course that subsequent practitioners of the 
tradition largely took, repudiating the “linguistic turn” itself and finding external reasons to 
think that the question of language must be badly posed or in itself illusory, despite the massively 
evident dependence of earlier analytic philosophy on proposed answers to it, and despite the 
manifold ways it arises routinely in the course of daily life.  (It is, as well, this decision to 
abandon the problem of language in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, that led most directly to the 
contemporary dominance of both naturalism in epistemology and essentialism in metaphysics.)  
However, given the failure of structuralist answers to the problem of language on the level of 
theory, an alternative resolution – one that was not in fact taken, but could have been,– would 
have been to take up the problem anew on the level of critique.  Had philosophers, rather than 
abandoning the problem, taken it up in this way, they might have been led to a far-ranging 
reflection on the practical significance of the problem of our relation to language, as we 
experience this relation in the forms of our lives; and as I have argued in my book, this 
reflection could at several points make very close contact with aspects of the twentieth-century 
“continental” tradition as it has similarly taken up the critical, social, and political implications of 
our relationship to the language that we speak.  In this way, the analytic tradition’s investigation 
of language could indeed have led to a renewed and enhanced opening of what Heidegger calls 
the question of the being of language.14  Moreover, it could have brought to this critical 
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reflection the full resources of the analytic tradition’s truth-conditional and logically based 
theories of language, which improve upon anything available in the continental tradition in many 
respects.  It is indeed regrettable that, leaving aside a few figures (the most prominent of these 
is Stanley Cavell), the analytic tradition has largely chosen the first rather than the second way 
of responding to the failure of structuralist theories to respond to the problem of language; it is 
to be hoped that a historically based retrieval of this problem, grounded in an understanding of 
the original problems and motivations that inaugurated the analytic tradition to begin with and 
their similarities to those motivating the parallel “contintental” streams of philosophical 
thought, can today lead to a resumption and intensification of the significant critical and 
sociopolitical potential of the analytic movement itself. 
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Notes 
1 Quine (1960) 
2 See, e.g., PI sections 81, 201, and 217 among others.   
3 Davidson (1965), (1970), (1973a), and (1973b).   
4 Davidson (1974).   
5 In saying that Davidson presupposes an “intra-linguistic” view of interpretation, I do not mean 
to deny that his framework can help us make sense of translation between two different 
languages.  I just mean that it does not help us to understand how we can enter into a 
linguistically shaped understanding of the world from a position innocent of that understanding.   
6 See, e.g., Davidson 1965 and 1973b. 
7 That is, attribution of knowledge of a language, if this knowledge is captured in a Davidsonian 
interpretation theory, must also involve attributing the capacity to use, at least, those basic 
concepts that are picked out by whatever elementary terms are specified in the specifications of 
the underlying recursive rules.   
8 Dummett (1975).   
9 McDowell 1983, p. 96. 
10 In my book and in greater detail in my essay, I take McDowell to task for assuming, in Mind 
and World, that language can be treated as a “repository of tradition” and a “store of reasons” 
without a more specific account of what is involved in knowing or learning a language than 
McDowell himself is prepared to give.  Nevertheless, I think that McDowell is quite right to 
argue, in the two essays in which he addresses the issue of modesty, that a Davidsonian 
interpretation theory cannot itself provide an account of how language embodies concepts and 
reasons in this sense.  
11 McDowell 1997, pp. 116-17. 
12 The term “attunement” is Stanley Cavell’s.  I am indebted here to his analyses in Cavell 
(1969) and, especially, (1979).   
13 Kant (1789), A vii. 
14 This problem is, as I understand it, quite easy and straightforward to state.  It is the question: 
“what kind of thing is language?” asked without prejudice to the claim that it must indeed be a 
thing (that is, something that sustains unproblematic objective reference like a tree or a 
building).  Simply formulating this question – which is what I take to be Heidegger’s primary goal 
in his discussions of language, beginning at least with Being and Time (e.g. section 34) – does not 
seem to me at all to involve “nostalgia” or the search for some chimerical relationship between 
language and “Being.”  In the sense in which it is relevant to Heidegger’s reflection on language, 
the question of being is just the question of the ground and nature of the existence of language 
(if it exists at all) and its relation to us.  In that sense, I am further puzzled as to how “Being” 
could be (as Wheeler seems to suggest) anything like a “posit.”   
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